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In theory, influenza viruses can be transmitted through
aerosols, large droplets, or direct contact with secretions
(or fomites). These 3 modes are not mutually exclusive.
Published findings that support the occurrence of aerosol
transmission were reviewed to assess the importance of
this mode of transmission. Published evidence indicates
that aerosol transmission of influenza can be an important
mode of transmission, which has obvious implications for
pandemic influenza planning and in particular for recom-
mendations about the use of N95 respirators as part of per-
sonal protective equipment.
C
oncerns about the likely occurrence of an influenza
pandemic in the near future are increasing. The high-
ly pathogenic strains of influenza A(H5N1) virus circulat-
ing in Asia, Europe, and Africa have become the most
feared candidates for giving rise to a pandemic strain.
Several authors have stated that large-droplet transmis-
sion is the predominant mode by which influenza virus
infection is acquired (1–3). As a consequence of this opin-
ion, protection against infectious aerosols is often ignored
for influenza, including in the context of influenza pan-
demic preparedness. For example, the Canadian Pandemic
Influenza Plan and the US Department of Health and
Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan (4,5) recom-
mend surgical masks, not N95 respirators, as part of per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE) for routine patient care.
This position contradicts the knowledge on influenza virus
transmission accumulated in the past several decades.
Indeed, the relevant chapters of many reference books,
written by recognized authorities, refer to aerosols as an
important mode of transmission for influenza (6–9).
In preparation for a possible pandemic caused by a
highly lethal virus such as influenza A(H5N1), making the
assumption that the role of aerosols in transmission of this
virus will be similar to their role in the transmission of
known human influenza viruses would seem rational.
Because infection with influenza A(H5N1) virus is associ-
ated with high death rates and because healthcare workers
cannot as yet be protected by vaccination, recommending
an enhanced level of protection, including the use of N95
respirators as part of PPE, is important. Following are a
brief review of the relevant published findings that support
the importance of aerosol transmission of influenza and a
brief discussion on the implications of these findings on
pandemic preparedness.
Influenza Virus Aerosols
By definition, aerosols are suspensions in air (or in a
gas) of solid or liquid particles, small enough that they
remain airborne for prolonged periods because of their low
settling velocity. For spherical particles of unit density, set-
tling times (for a 3-m fall) for specific diameters are 10 s
for 100 µm, 4 min for 20 µm, 17 min for 10 µm, and 62
min for 5 µm; particles with a diameter <3 µm essentially
do not settle. Settling times can be further affected by air
turbulence (10,11).
The median diameters at which particles exhibit aerosol
behavior also correspond to the sizes at which they are
efficiently deposited in the lower respiratory tract when
inhaled. Particles of >6-µm diameter are trapped increas-
ingly in the upper respiratory tract (12); no substantial dep-
osition in the lower respiratory tract occurs at >20  µm
(11,12). Many authors adopt a size cutoff of <5 µm for
aerosols. This convenient convention is, however, some-
what arbitrary, because the long settling time and the effi-
cient deposition in the lower respiratory tract are properties
that do not appear abruptly at a specific diameter value.
Certainly, particles in the micron or submicron range will
behave as aerosols, and particles >10–20 µm will settle
rapidly, will not be deposited in the lower respiratory tract,
and are referred to as large droplets (10–12).
Coughing or sneezing generates a substantial quantity
of particles, a large number of which are <5–10 µm in
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diameter [reviewed in (10)]. In addition, particles expelled
by coughing or sneezing rapidly shrink in size by evapora-
tion, thereby increasing the number of particles that
behave as aerosols. Particles shrunken by evaporation are
referred to as droplet nuclei (10–12). This phenomenon
affects particles with a diameter at emission of <20 µm,
and complete desiccation would decrease the diameter to a
little less than half the initial diameter (10). Droplet nuclei
are hygroscopic. When exposed to humid air (as in the
lungs), they will swell back. One would expect that inhaled
hygroscopic particles would be retained in the lower respi-
ratory tract with greater efficiency, and this hypothesis has
been confirmed experimentally (11,12). Because aerosols
remain airborne, they can be carried over large distances,
which may create a potential for long-range infections.
The occurrence of long-range infections is affected by sev-
eral other factors. These include dilution, the infectious
dose, the amount of infectious particles produced, the
duration of shedding of the infectious agent, and the per-
sistence of the agent in the environment (11). Inferring an
absence of aerosols because long-range infections are not
frequently observed is incorrect.
Humans acutely infected with influenza A virus have a
high virus titer in their respiratory secretions, which will
be aerosolized when the patient sneezes or coughs. The
viral titer measured in nasopharyngeal washes culminates
on approximately day 2 or 3 after infection and can reach
up to 107 50% tissue culture infective dose (TCID50)/mL
(13,14). The persistence of the infectivity of influenza
virus in aerosols has been studied in the laboratory. In
experiments that used homogeneous aerosolized influenza
virus suspensions (mean diameter 6 µm), virus infectivity
(assessed by in vitro culture) at a fixed relative humidity
undergoes an exponential decay; this decay is character-
ized by very low death rate constants, provided that the rel-
ative humidity was in the low range of 15%–40% (15,16).
These results are consistent with those of an older study
(admittedly performed in a more rudimentary manner) in
which infectious influenza viruses in an aerosol could be
demonstrated for up to 24 h by using infection in mice as
a detection method, provided that the relative humidity
was 17%−24% (17). In all these studies, the decay of virus
infectivity increased rapidly at relative humidity >40%.
The increased survival of influenza virus in aerosols at low
relative humidity has been suggested as a factor that
accounts for the seasonality of influenza (15,16). The
sharply increased decay of infectivity at high humidity has
also been observed for other enveloped viruses (e.g.,
measles virus); in contrast, exactly the opposite relation-
ship has been shown for some nonenveloped viruses (e.g.,
poliovirus) (11,15,16).
Experimental Influenza Infection
Experimental infection studies permit the clear separa-
tion of the aerosol route of transmission from transmission
by large droplets. Laboratory preparation of homogeneous
small particle aerosols free of large droplets is readily
achieved (13,18). Conversely, transmission by large
droplets without accompanying aerosols can be achieved
by intranasal drop inoculation (13).
Influenza infection has been documented by aerosol
exposure in the mouse model, the squirrel monkey model,
and human volunteers (12,13,17–19). Observations made
during experimental infections with human volunteers are
particularly interesting and relevant. In studies conducted
by Alford and colleagues (18), volunteers were exposed to
carefully titrated aerosolized influenza virus suspensions
by inhaling 10 Lof aerosol through a face mask. The diam-
eter of the aerosol particles was 1 µm–3  µm. Demon-
stration of infection in participants in the study was
achieved by recovery of infectious viruses from throat
swabs, taken daily, or by seroconversion, i.e., development
of neutralizing antibodies. The use of carefully titrated
viral stocks enabled the determination of the minimal
infectious dose by aerosol inoculation. For volunteers who
lacked detectable neutralizing antibodies at the onset, the
50% human infectious dose (HID50) was 0.6–3.0 TCID50,
if one assumes a retention of 60% of the inhaled particles
(18). In contrast, the HID50 measured when inoculation
was performed by intranasal drops was 127–320 TCID50
(13). Additional data from experiments conducted with
aerosolized influenza virus (average diameter 1.5 µm)
showed that when a dose of 3 TCID50 was inhaled, ≈1
TCID50 only was deposited in the nose (12). Since the dose
deposited in the nose is largely below the minimal dose
required by intranasal inoculation, this would indicate that
the preferred site of infection initiation during aerosol
inoculation is the lower respiratory tract. Another relevant
observation is that whereas the clinical symptoms initiated
by aerosol inoculation covered the spectrum of symptoms
seen in natural infections, the disease observed in study
participants infected experimentally by intranasal drops
was milder, with a longer incubation time and usually no
involvement of the lower respiratory tract (13,20). For
safety reasons, this finding led to the adoption of intranasal
drop inoculation as the standard procedure in human
experimental infections with influenza virus (13).
Additional support for the view that the lower respira-
tory tract (which is most efficiently reached by the aerosol
route) is the preferred site of infection is provided by stud-
ies on the use of zanamivir for prophylaxis. In experimen-
tal settings, intranasal zanamivir was protective against
experimental inoculation with influenza virus in intranasal
drops (21). However, in studies on prophylaxis of naturalinfection, intranasally applied zanamivir was not protec-
tive (22), whereas inhaled zanamivir was protective in one
study (23) and a protective effect approached statistical
significance in another study (22). These experiments and
observations strongly support the view that many, possibly
most, natural influenza infections occur by the aerosol
route and that the lower respiratory tract may be the pre-
ferred site of initiation of the infection.
Epidemiologic Observations
In natural infections, the postulated modes of transmis-
sion have included aerosols, large droplets, and direct con-
tact with secretions or fomites because the virus can
remain infectious on nonporous dry surfaces for <48 hours
(24). Because in practice completely ruling out contribu-
tions of a given mode of transmission is often difficult, the
relative contribution of each mode is usually difficult to
establish by epidemiologic studies alone. However, a cer-
tain number of observations are consistent with and strong-
ly suggestive of an important role for aerosol transmission
in natural infections, for example the “explosive nature
and simultaneous onset [of disease] in many persons” (9),
including in nosocomial outbreaks (25). The often-cited
outbreak described by Moser et al. on an airplane with a
defective ventilation system is best accounted for by
aerosol transmission (26). Even more compelling were the
observations made at the Livermore Veterans
Administration Hospital during the 1957–58 pandemic.
The study group consisted of 209 tuberculous patients con-
fined during their hospitalization to a building with ceil-
ing-mounted UV lights; 396 tuberculous patients
hospitalized in other buildings that lacked these lights con-
stituted the control group. Although the study group partic-
ipants remained confined to the building, they were
attended to by the same personnel as the control group, and
there were no restrictions on visits from the community.
Thus, it was unavoidable at some point that attending per-
sonnel and visitors would introduce influenza virus in both
groups. During the second wave of the pandemic, the con-
trol group and the personnel sustained a robust outbreak of
respiratory illness, shown retrospectively by serology to be
due to the pandemic strain influenza A (H2N2), whereas
the group in the irradiated building remained symptom
free. The seroconversion rate to influenza A (H2N2) was
19% in the control group, 18% in personnel, but only 2%
in the study group (27,28). 
Whereas UV irradiation is highly effective in inactivat-
ing viruses in small-particle aerosols, it is ineffective for
surface decontamination because of poor surface penetra-
tions. It is also ineffective for large droplets because the
germicidal activity sharply decreases as the relative
humidity increases (28). Furthermore, because the installa-
tion of UV lights was set up in such a way as to decontam-
inate the upper air of rooms only, large droplets would not
have been exposed to UV, whereas aerosols, carried by
thermal air mixing, would have been exposed (27,28). So
in effect in this study only the aerosol route of infection
was blocked, and this step alone achieved near complete
protection.
The converse occurrence, blocking only the large
droplet and fomites routes in natural infections, can be
inferred from the studies on the use of zanamivir for pro-
phylaxis described previously. In experimental settings,
intranasally applied zanamivir was protective against an
experimental challenge with influenza by intranasal drops
(21). However, in studies on prophylaxis of natural dis-
ease, intranasal zanamivir was not protective (22), which
leads to the conclusion that natural infection can occur
efficiently by a route other than large droplets or fomites.
As noted above, inhaled zanamivir was significantly pro-
tective (22,23).
Discussion and Implications for Infection
Control during Influenza A (H5) Pandemic
In principle, influenza viruses can be transmitted by 3
routes: aerosols, large droplets, and direct contact with
secretions (or with fomites). These 3 routes are not mutu-
ally exclusive and, as noted above, may be difficult to dis-
entangle in natural infections.
For the purpose of deciding on the use of N95 respira-
tors in a pandemic, showing that aerosol transmission
occurs at appreciable rates is sufficient. Evidence support-
ing aerosol transmission, reviewed above, appears com-
pelling. Despite the evidence cited in support of aerosol
transmission, many guidelines or review articles neverthe-
less routinely state that “large droplets transmission is
thought to be the main mode of influenza transmission” (or
similar statements) without providing supporting evidence
from either previously published studies or empirical find-
ings. Despite extensive searches, I have not found a study
that proves the notion that large-droplets transmission is
predominant and that aerosol transmission is negligible (or
nonexistent). Reports on many outbreaks suggest that
influenza aerosols are rapidly diluted because long-range
infections occur most spectacularly in situations of crowd-
ing and poor ventilation (25,26). However, even if long-
range infections do not readily occur when sufficient
ventilation exists, this does not rule out the presence at
closer range of infectious particles in the micron or submi-
cron range, against which surgical masks would offer little
protection (29,30). Many infection control practitioners
have argued that the introduction of large-droplets precau-
tions in institutions has proven sufficient to interrupt
influenza outbreaks and therefore that aerosol transmission
appears negligible. This evidence is, unfortunately, incon-
clusive because of several confounding or mitigating
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obtained, respiratory syncytial virus outbreaks can be mis-
taken for influenza outbreaks (9), which would artificially
increase the perceived “effectiveness” of large-droplets
precautions against influenza. Second, serologic studies
are often not conducted, and therefore asymptomatic infec-
tions are not documented (among healthcare workers a
large fraction of influenza infections are asymptomatic or
mistaken for another disease [31]). Third, since we are in
an interpandemic period and the viruses currently circulat-
ing have been drifting from related strains for decades, we
all have partial immunity against these viruses, immunity
that is further boosted in vaccinated healthcare workers. It
has even been argued that after several decades of circula-
tion the current human influenza viruses are undergoing
gradual attenuation (32). Finally, surgical masks (used in
large-droplets precautions) do not offer reliable protection
against aerosols, but they nevertheless have a partially pro-
tective effect, which further confuses the issue (29,30).
In contrast, the situation with a pandemic strain of
influenza A (H5) would become only too clear because no
one would have any degree of immunity against such a
virus, vaccines would not be available for months, and
these viruses would likely be highly virulent. Even though
efficient human-to-human transmission of the A (H5N1)
virus has not yet been observed (by any mode), transmis-
sion of influenza A (H5N1) by aerosols from geese to
quails has been demonstrated in the laboratory (33). Thus,
even in the current incarnation of A (H5N1), infection by
the virus can generate aerosols that are infectious for high-
ly susceptible hosts. As far as we know, 1 of the main
blocks to efficient human-to-human transmission of
influenza A (H5N1) is the virus’s current preference for
specific sialic acid receptors. The current strains still pre-
fer  α-2,3–linked sialic acids, which is typical of avian
influenza viruses, whereas human influenza viruses bind
preferentially to α-2,6–linked sialic acids (34–36). In all
likelihood, 1 of the mutations required for influenza A
(H5N1) to give rise to a pandemic strain would be to
change its receptor affinity to favor the α-2,6–linked sialic
acids. For the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic strain of
1918, this change required only 1 or 2 amino acid substi-
tutions (36). Once a highly transmissible strain of influen-
za A (H5) has arisen, it will likely spread in part by
aerosols, like other human influenza viruses.
Recent studies have shown that whereas epithelial cells
in the human respiratory tract express predominantly the
α-2,6 sialic acid receptor, cells expressing the α-2,3 recep-
tor were detected only occasionally in the upper respirato-
ry tract; however, measurable expression of α-2,3–linked
sialic acid receptors was found in some cells in the alveo-
lar epithelium and at the junction of alveolus and terminal
bronchiole (35). Binding of influenza A (H5N1) virus can
be demonstrated in human tissue sections from the respira-
tory tract in a distribution corresponding to that of the α-
2,3 receptors in the respiratory tract (34,35). This pattern
of virus binding correlates well with autopsy findings,
which show extensive alveolar damage (34,37), and also
correlates well with the observation that recovery of the A
(H5N1) virus is much more difficult from nasal swabs than
from throat swabs (37). Thus, in the respiratory system the
current strains of A (H5N1) appear to infect mostly (per-
haps exclusively) the lower respiratory tract. If that is
indeed the case, it in turn suggests that human cases of
avian influenza were acquired by exposure to an aerosol,
since large droplets would not have delivered the virus to
the lower respiratory tract. (Another hypothesis might be
gastrointestinal infection, followed by viremia and dissem-
ination, but not all patients have gastrointestinal symptoms
[37]). Given the strong evidence for aerosol transmission
of influenza viruses in general, and the high lethality of the
current strains of avian influenza A (H5N1) (37), recom-
mending the use of N95 respirators, not surgical masks, as
part of the protective equipment seems rational.
Several infection control guidelines for influenza have
recently been published, some specifically aimed at the
current strains of A (H5N1), others as part of more com-
prehensive pandemic plans that address the emergence not
only of a pandemic form of A (H5) but also of other types
of pandemic influenza viruses. Even though to date
human-to-human transmission of A (H5N1) remains very
inefficient, the high lethality of the infection and potential
for mutations call for prudence. The use of N95 respirators
is included in the 2004 recommendations of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention for healthcare workers
who treat patients with known or suspected avian influen-
za (38). The World Health Organization’s current (April
2006) guidelines for avian influenza recommend the use of
airborne precautions when possible, including the use of
N95 respirators when entering patients’ rooms (39).
Currently, several pandemic plans differ considerably
in their recommendations for infection control precautions
and PPE. The current version of the Canadian pandemic
plan recommends surgical masks only, disregarding data
that support the aerosol transmission of influenza (4). The
US pandemic plans (5) and the British plans, from both the
National Health Service (available from http:// www.dh.
gov.uk/PublicationsAndStatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/PublicationsPolicyAndG
uidanceArticle/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=4121735&chk=Z6k
jQY) and the Health Protection Agency (http://www.
hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/influenza/pandemic/
pdfs/HPAPandemicplan.pdf), acknowledge the contribu-
tion of aerosols in influenza but curiously recommend sur-
gical masks for routine care; the use of N95 respirators is
reserved for protection during “aerosolizing procedures”
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(5,40). These recommendations fail to recognize that
infectious aerosols will also be generated by coughing and
sneezing. The Australian Management Plan for Pandemic
Influenza (June 2005) recommends N95 respirators for
healthcare workers (http://www.health.gov.au/internet/
wcms/Publishing.nsf/Content/phd-pandemic-plan.htm),
and in France, the Plan gouvernemental de prévention et
de lutte <<Pandémie grippale>>(January 2006) recom-
mends FFP2 respirators (equivalent to N95 respirators)
(http://www.splf.org/s/IMG/pdf/plan-grip-janvier06.pdf).
Given the scientific evidence that supports the occurrence
of aerosol transmission of influenza, carefully reexamining
current recommendations for PPE equipment would
appear necessary.
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